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In this short paper, we present an integrated approach to detecting and mitigating cyber-attacks to modern
interconnected industrial control systems. One of the primary goals of this approach is that it is cost-
effective, and thus whenever possible it builds on open-source security technologies and open standards,
which are complemented with novel security solutions that address the specific challenges of securing
critical infrastructures.
Detection, Response, Cyber-attacks, Security Architectures
1. INTRODUCTION
When examining cyber and operational risk mitiga-
tion strategies, it is understandable that technolo-
gists tend to focus more on the technology side than
the business side. However, the original decisions
to modernise and deploy SCADA systems within
national infrastructures were based on business
assessments, which determined that the required
investments were justified based on quantifiable fi-
nancial benefits and non-quantifiable benefits, such
as improved level of service and customer satis-
faction (Ehrenreich (2005)). Similarly, current and
future investment decisions in cyber-security will be
based on a business case examining the financial
implications and other intangible risks and benefits.
Infrastructure operators will thus make decisions
on their cyber-security posture based ultimately on
a business assessment. Arguably, the emergence
of sophisticated targeted attacks, such as Stuxnet,
Duqu and Flame, or the effectiveness of bleeding
edge technologies that attempt to detect such
advanced persistent threats (APTs), will play only
a small part in the decision process for most
small-to-medium size operators. Why? Because, as
discussed by Cardenas et al. (2009), not only will
an all powerful adversary usually defeat security
mechanisms, but the cost of defence will be
prohibitively high. In practice, the risk for a small-to-
medium size operator of being directly targeted by a
truly APT, such as Stuxnet, is quite low. Therefore,
given (a) the very low probability, and (b) the low
chance of resisting such an attack, there is not a
strong business case for implementing costly APT
risk mitigation strategies.
Consequently, the scope of this presented work is
to explore a cyber-security approach that meets
the business needs of small-to-medium sized op-
erators of industrial controls systems that support
national infrastructure, in terms of both cost and
satisfactory cyber-risk mitigation. The architecture
described herein was developed in the context of
the EU-funded PRECYSE project1, which includes
such critical infrastructure operators. Primary re-
quirements from these operators include that secu-
rity measures should not disrupt operational systems
and be implementable at a reasonable cost. To
address the first requirement the implementation of
the architecture takes an overlay-based approach,
requiring a minimal number of monitoring interfaces
to the operational infrastructure. The second require-
ment is addressed by, wherever possible, integrating
open-source solutions with necessary novel security
technologies, via the use of open standards.
The approach proposed in this paper can be used to
by operators to detect cyber-threats in the different
domains (or enclaves) that are associated with
their infrastructure, and supports the execution of
appropriate response strategies.
1The PRECYSE project https://www.precyse.eu
c© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
Submitted to ICS-CSR for review
PRECYSE: Cyber-attack Detection and Response for Industrial Control Systems
McLaughlin et al.
2. RELATED WORK
There is a great deal of related work in the area
of detecting and responding to cyber-attacks; here
we provide a brief summary. The canonical network
intrusion detection system (IDS) is the open-source
Snort IDS2 tool. Snort makes use of signatures
– descriptions of malicious behaviour – to detect
attacks. Similarly, commercial systems from Cisco3
and others make use of signatures to detect attacks.
The PRECYSE approach builds on these systems,
and adds capabilities, regarding the detection of
the misuse of SCADA protocols (as discussed
in Section 3.2). Complementing signature-based
detection, there has been significant research
interest and deployment of systems that aim to
identify deviations from normal traffic behaviour
– anomalies – that are indicative of an attack
(Chandola et al. (2009)). PRECYSE implements
a flexible open standards-based approach to
integrating such detection systems, and uses novel
systems to detect anomalies in system behaviour.
In a similar way, Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) solutions aim to correlate
and visualise detection events from IDSs, in order
to develop situation awareness. Perhaps the best
known SIEM solution is the Open Source Security
Information Management (OSSIM)4 system. Using
OSSIM, so-called directives can be used to correlate
alerts from IDSs and, using a risk-based approach,
generate alarms that an operator can act on.
Commercial products from companies, such as
RSA5, offer similar solutions to OSSIM, and make
use of big data to implement security analytics tasks
(Cybenko and Landwehr (2012)). To the best of our
knowledge, these systems are not able to readily
integrate data from both the ICT and ICS domain of
a critical information infrastructure, as we propose.
As part of an overall approach to network resilience
(Sterbenz et al. (2010)), Schaeffer-Filho et al.
(2012) have developed a resilience management
framework. The management framework realises
a control loop, which takes detection events
from a network infrastructure and, based on
policies, determines a suitable remediation action
to implement. This is similar to the approach
proposed by PRECYSE. However, their work
focuses on threats to large ICT networks, and
evaluation of the management framework has largely
been simulation-based - in contrast, PRECYSE is
developing a prototype implementation.
2Snort IDS http://www.snort.org/
3Cisco Intrusion Prevention System http://www.cisco.com/go/ips
4The OSSIM SIEM solution http://www.alienvault.com/open-
threat-exchange
5http://www.emc.com/security/security-analytics/security-
analytics.htm
3. THE PRECYSE APPROACH: DETECTION
AND COUNTERMEASURE
Although past evidence6 is limited, it suggests
attacks on operators of small-to-medium sized
infrastructure often begin with successful intrusion
through exterior defences, in order to execute
further activities. A basic cyber-security strategy
that focuses mainly on preventing attacks from
penetrating the exterior will quite probably not detect
malicious activities once the intruder is inside.
Therefore, in order to improve upon such a basic
cyber-security stance, and taking into account the
primary requirements identified by the operators in
PRECYSE, an approach to detecting and mitigating
cyber-attacks is proposed that adopts several key
features for improving cyber-protection for small-
to-medium sized operators: (i) the use of security
enclaves; (ii) perimeter defence and interior anomaly
detection; (iii) an event correlation framework; (iv)
countermeasure management system; and (v) an
open source and standards based approach.
A security enclave is a group of systems with
common security policies, in order to minimize the
attack surface and the impact of a security breach
(NIST Joint Task Force (2013)). Enclaves may be
defined by logic function, role or physical location.
Figure 1 shows how an operator’s infrastructure can
be divided into Process network, SCADA network,
Office Network and Central System enclaves.
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Figure 1: Overview of the PRECYSE network enclaves
The proposed approach is that enclaves are mon-
itored by a comprehensive set of tools in order to
protect all classes of ICT and ICS assets. For en-
claves that include specialised SCADA operations,
customised tools can be adopted to enhance secu-
rity monitoring capabilities. For example, a security
client may check for compliance to protocols in the
6”Hackers darkened cities, CIA says”
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/666
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SCADA communications, while another assesses
the wider network communications for anomalous
patterns. Each security tool provides local security,
attack detection and log management, while a cen-
tral system provides decision making across en-
claves, regarding attack mitigation and the issuance
of countermeasures during attacks.
3.1. Architecture Implementation
We are currently developing a first prototype of
the approach described above. Where possible, the
implementation makes use of existing open-source
tools and open standards, as a way of managing
implementation costs and the integration of new
technologies. Reflecting our end-user requirements,
the implementation requires minimal disruption to
the existing infrastructure – monitoring of the
infrastructure is realised using network taps and via
the analysis of operational log files.
Furthermore, the approach is deployed as an overlay
to the target infrastructure enclaves, using virtualised
networks (VLANs) and systems. The various detec-
tion systems communicate via an Enterprise Service
Bus (ESB), allowing the flexible integration of new
security services. The various detection systems
generate alerts in the Intrusion Detection Message
Exchange Format (IDMEF) (Debar et al. (2007)).
As necessary, adaptors have been developed that
can generate and consume IDMEF messages, in the
Web services SOAP format, for each of the systems
in the architecture.
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Figure 2: The detection technologies that are applied to
the ICS and ICT enclaves, from a system and network
perspective
To ensure coverage of the different enclaves of
a critical infrastructure, we make use of a range
of detection capabilities, which are summarised
in Figure 2. In what follows, we provide a brief
introduction to each of these technologies.
3.2. Intrusion Detection for IEC 60870-5-104
The IEC 60870-5-104 SCADA protocol is widely
used for telecontrol communications for water, gas
and electricity systems, and is of specific interest
to end-users within PRECYSE. In the project, we
have developed a SCADA IDS toolset for the IEC
104 protocol, based on deep-packet inspection of
SCADA packets at the application layer. This enables
protocol verification and data correlation approaches
to be deployed. In one approach, custom rules for
IEC 104 have been derived that are compatible
with the Snort IDS (Yang et al. (2013)). In a
second approach, this is enhanced with stateful
analysis of the protocol across the packet flow to
enable a more sophisticated analysis of the IEC
104 communications (Yang et al. (2014)). The aim
is to monitor the SCADA communications at the
application layer, in comparison to standard tools
that only examine the TCP/IP layers. Although IEC
104 is the focus here, we propose that similar IDS
tools can be used to secure different SCADA network
enclaves, which use protocols such as IEC 61850.
3.3. AECID: Correlating Anomalous Behaviour
As part of the operational management of the ICT
and industrial control systems in a critical information
infrastructure, logging data is produced to report
events, internal state changes, and committed
actions. This data is used by the Automatic Event
Correlation for Incident Detection (AECID) system
to detect anomalous behaviour, which could be
indicative of an attack (Skopik et al. (2014)). AECID
collects log files from systems in the ICT and
ICS domain, maintaining the temporal order of log
messages, and creates search patterns from single
log lines. The aim of AECID is to correlate the
different events, expressed in log lines, including
their relative position to each other. For that purpose,
it creates hypotheses about causes and effects. If a
hypothesis can be confirmed as valid, it becomes a
part of a model of the system. An ongoing statistical
analysis of correlation results allows the system to
infer the degree of deviation of “if-then” hypotheses
related to events, and therefore determine a degree
of anomalous behaviour.
3.4. Integrated ICT Security Solutions
As discussed, we target the use of open-source
tools where possible, and we have integrated and
deployed just such a toolset to provide monitoring
capabilities across a broad spectrum of network
data, including configuration, topology and traffic.
A common data model is used for all processing
of data in order to provide interoperability. The
open-source toolset comprises: a set of tools
(Snort, Barnyard, PRADS, netsniff-ng) observing the
network traffic; a firewall system for the enforcement
of traffic blocking countermeasure actions, based on
Netfilter and Shorewall; a host-based IDS, based on
OSSEC; and a user interface that is used within an
enclave, based on Sguil, Squert and MySQL.
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3.5. Issuing Countermeasures
The alerts from the aforementioned systems are
subjected to a correlation phase – for the first version
of the implementation, we propose to leverage the
solution provided by OSSIM. A challenge associated
with this approach is the specification of suitable
correlation directives; future work will seek to
develop machine learning approaches to support
this process, in a similar manner to the AECID
system. After the correlation phase, an alarm is
presented to an operator that can be used as a
basis for issuing a countermeasure to the attack,
e.g., block network traffic or isolating systems. In
previous work, we have developed the concept of
management patterns that describe best-practices
for addressing specific threats, using a number
of remedial systems. These were focused on the
description of remediation strategies for challenges
to ICT networks. Moving forward, we plan to express
these management patterns for the other enclaves
of a critical information infrastructure, building on the
Common Remediation Enumeration (CRE) format7.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a cyber-security approach for
securing small-to-medium sized ICS infrastructures,
which meets the requirements of users in the
PRECYSE project. The most significant feature
of this work is that the approach is sufficient to
provide comprehensive monitoring of ICS and ICT
domains, while also meeting budgetary constraints
through the adoption of open-source methods,
where possible. Additionally, novel security tools
have been developed and integrated to provide
further tailored monitoring of SCADA protocols
and for behavioural anomaly detection. The flexible
approach allows the toolset to be tailored to enclaves
with differing security polices, and for the integration
of further tools where necessary. In PRECYSE, we
have implemented a first version of the approach
at two ICS demo sites, where verification via a
comprehensive range of cyber-attack use cases is
ongoing.
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